

OROVILLE DAM CITIZENS ADVISORY COMMISSION

**Meeting 21
October 24, 2025**

Hosted by the California Natural Resources Agency



ITEM 1

WELCOME

ROLL CALL

- Secretary of the California Natural Resources Agency
- California State Assembly
- California State Senate
- Director of the Department of Water Resources
- Director of the Office of Emergency Services
- Director of the Department of Parks and Recreation
- CHP Butte County Field Division Appointee
- City of Oroville Appointees
- County of Butte Appointees
- County of Sutter Appointees
- County of Yuba Appointees
- Butte County Sheriff Appointee
- Sutter County Sheriff Appointee
- Yuba County Sheriff Appointee

OPENING REMARKS CONTINUED

ITEM 2

OROVILLE DAM SAFETY PROGRAM UPDATE

David Sarkisian, PE, CEG

Manager, Dam Safety Services

Division of Operations and Maintenance

Update/Topics

- Condition Assessment Ratings and Emergency Spillway Erodibility Study
- Flood Control Outlet Projects and Activities
- Director's Safety Review Board and FERC Part 12D Safety Inspections



Condition Assessment Ratings

- FERC and DSOD assign Condition Assessment Ratings as well as Hazard Potential Classifications.
- FERC's ratings are adopted and posted in the National Inventory of Dams Database.
- DSOD: Current Rating of "Fair" due to questions about the emergency spillway's ability to pass the Probable Maximum Flood without experiencing excessive erosion that could compromise the stability of the ES monoliths and result in an uncontrolled release.
- Also reflected in NID database.

← National Inventory of Dams ADVANCED SEARCH ABOUT THE NID DAMS BASICS MEDIA RESOURCES

Oroville

FED ID CA00035 Location Butte, California Owner Name California Department of Water Resources Owner Type State Data Updated 01/19/2024

SUMMARY DESCRIPTION STRUCTURE INSPECTION AND EVALUATION RESPONSE PREPAREDNESS ATTACHMENTS

Info Map DOWNLOAD DATA ?

Layer Controls LEGEND

Inspections

Last Inspection Date	Inspection Frequency (Years)	
06/06/2023	1	
Operational Status	Operational Status Date	
Under Remediation	09/29/2023	
Hazard Potential Classification	Condition Assessment	Condition Assessment Date
High	Fair	09/29/2023

Lake Oroville Kelly Ri

Satisfactory

No existing or potential dam safety deficiencies are recognized. Acceptable performance is expected under all loading conditions (static, hydrologic, seismic) in accordance with the minimum applicable state or federal regulatory criteria or tolerable risk guidelines.

Fair

No existing dam safety deficiencies are recognized for normal operating conditions. Rare or extreme hydrologic and/or seismic events may result in a dam safety deficiency. Risk may be in the range to take further action. Note: Rare or extreme event is defined by the regulatory agency based on their minimum applicable state or federal criteria.

Poor

A dam safety deficiency is recognized for normal operating conditions which may realistically occur. Remedial action is necessary. POOR may also be used when uncertainties exist as to critical analysis parameters which identify a potential dam safety deficiency. Investigations and studies are necessary.


Unsatisfactory

A dam safety deficiency is recognized that requires immediate or emergency remedial action for problem resolution.



Emergency Spillway Erodibility Study

- State-of-the-art analysis
 - Back-Analysis of 2017 Incident utilized to establish Erodibility Parameters.
 - Considered time-rate of scour (rather than infinite flow at peak discharge)
- Two cross sections evaluated through the drainages within the roller compacted concrete apron that concentrate flows.





Scenario	Peak Reservoir Elevation (feet) NGVD29	Peak Emergency Spillway Discharge (cfs)	Approximate Return Period
1	907.5	90,000	2,000-yr
2	910.2	155,000	3,000-yr
3	914.2	263,000	10,000-yr
4 (Probable Maximum Flood)	919.1	419,800	21,000-yr
5 (ARkStorm)	905.6	50,000	N/A

Emergency Spillway Erodibility Study

- Modeling results indicate that scour will not progress into Slightly Weathered Rock (green) for any of the outflows.

Main Conclusions:

- “The probabilistic results indicate the likelihood of spillway discharges undermining the Secant Pile Wall/Roller-Compacted Concrete (SPW/RCC) apron and causing head-cut progression towards the spillway crest is **improbable**.*
- No modeled hydrograph scenarios up to and including the PMF, for either the Main or Secondary Drainage, resulted in simulated scour propagating upstream of the SPW”.*



Next Steps


- July 2025: DWR submitted the Issue Evaluation Study (Plan) to FERC & DSOD that identifies the “feeder” studies needed and team to conduct a Quantitative Risk Analysis on the topic of ES erodibility and potential for head-cutting to the monoliths.
 - Oroville Dam Stochastic Flood Event Analysis to finish (Dec 2025)
 - Radial Gate Reliability Study to finish (Dec 2025)
 - Quantitative Risk Analysis Workshop – July 2026 (Alternate Sept 2026)
 - Issue Evaluation Study Report - Dec 2026 (Alternate March 2027)

This approach follows FERC’s Risk Informed Decision Making guidelines and processes adopted by the SWP Dam Safety Program to reach decisions for significant dam safety actions/projects.

- **Goal:** Reach consensus with FERC and DSOD on the Emergency Spillway’s performance and need for any action/improvements for dam safety.



Dam Safety Risk Process



Oroville Dam Flood Control Outlet Project/Activities

- Spillway Maintenance Contract (Spec No. 23-15) – Year 3 of 3
 - Informed by annual inspection conducted prior to contractor's full mobilization
 - Anticipate joint sealant repairs, minor concrete repairs.
- Radial Gate Standby Generator Project
 - Approved by FERC; Fulfills Comprehensive Needs Assessment Measure T3-BH.2
 - Includes installation of a new standby generator and associated equipment for gate operations, including improvements (quick-connects) for use of a temporary portable generator.
 - Fulfills Comprehensive Needs Assessment Measure T3-BH.2
 - Construction 2026-2028




Oroville Dam Flood Control Outlet Radial Gates

- Gates subject to full-open exercises every year that includes measurements of electrical power draw to monitor for any binding/friction.
- 2017: Hoist Rope magnetic particle testing – no wire breaks
- 2022: 10-year Structural, Mechanical, and Electrical Inspection
 - Found suitable for continued operation
 - Recommendations focused on continued maintenance and monitoring
 - Wire ropes inspected and measured, with no evidence of advanced wear
 - Inflatable side seals are not receiving sufficient pressure from water line to counter reservoir pressure, which results in leakage when the reservoir is high.
 - Seal rehabilitation project initiates in 2026






Photo 4-94: Gate 2 – Typical day-light gap observed at side seal.



(A)	(B)	(C)	(D)	(E)	(F)
Percentage of Coating Damage	Degree of Coating Repair	Coating Grade	Corrosion By Area	Max. Pit Depth	Overall Integrity
1-5%	Minor Spot	5	None	None	Good

Non-Destructive Examinations

- Radial gates are “tied” to the structure by high strength steel (tensioned) anchor rods embedded within the concrete piers.
- Rods are grouted, and would require invasive, destructive drilling for replacement. Curvature and density of rods makes replacement infeasible.
- Ultrasonic testing of anchor rods (382) performed on an annual basis to monitor for cracking/corrosion in vicinity to grip nut.
- Periodic testing by USACE performed (guided wave method) used to monitor for any breaks/major cracks at depth along the rod.
- No significant anomalies.
- Structural analyses indicate significant redundancy provided by number of rods, including for seismic loading.
- Alternatives for structural support or redundant gates being considered in upcoming Flood Control Outlet studies.




Oroville Dam Flood Control Outlet Project/Activities

- Radial Gate Reliability Study (December 2025)
 - Focuses on electrical, mechanical, and control equipment.
 - Evaluates historical performance, maintenance/inspection practices, and remaining service life.
 - Informs need to maintain or replace components most critical to gate operations and refine maintenance/inspection practices.
 - Serves as key input to other risk analyses that must consider the likelihood of radial gates to operate “on demand”.



Oroville Dam Flood Control Outlet Project/Activities

- Radial Gate Seismic Retrofits
 - Scope to include strengthening of select gate components (skinplate, vertical ribs, upper horizontal girder), coating repairs, and trunnion pin inspections. Address maintenance recommendations from inspections.
 - Design Phase: 2025-2028
 - Construction Phase: 2028-2037
 - Construction dependent on water levels and must consider other FCO activities such as hoist replacements.



Flood Control Outlet – Pier 10 Crack

Prior to 2017, the crack was monitored for changes and painted red to assist in visual monitoring for potential growth over time. Red paint (2-4 inches wide) was much wider than the crack itself (0.04 inches).

2018 Structural Inspection:

- Crack originates at a re-entrant corner of a notch in the pier wall for the roadway bridge deck.
- Extends down in upstream direction at about 45 degrees for about 12 feet.
- Measured as 0.04 inches wide (“fine” crack per USACE criteria)
- Non-structural in nature, caused by tensile stress concentrations at the re-entrant corner as a result of concrete shrinkage following construction.
- Minor seepage noted, fed by surface drainage adjacent/external to Pier 10 which concentrated water (corrected).
- All other cracks in FCO also considered non-structural and fine (0.04 inches wide or less).

2019 Crack Sealing: Epoxy injection and surface application

Annual Inspections – No notable changes



2019 Pier 10 Crack Sealing, light grey epoxy injection and surface application; much wider than actual crack which is 0.04 inches wide




Spillway Performance – Flood Control Outlet Piezometers




B-162 to -165

- Piezometers **have not** exhibited high ground water pressures with the spillway releases nor the high reservoir condition.
- B-162 (in grey), located in Pier 1 at the edge of the Monolith, continues to show a response to precipitation and sustained lake levels.
- Data continues to demonstrate high quality foundation and concrete-bedrock contact, and lack of uplift pressures



Reservoir Elev.



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Flood Control Outlet (FCO) Monoliths 25 & 26 Seismic Retrofits Timeline

2018-2021

- FCO Non-Linear Analysis of Existing Conditions
- Sophisticated computer modeling
- Submitted Results to DSOD & FERC

2022-2027

- Incorporate Piezometer Data into Modeling
- Quantitative Risk Analysis
- Identify most effective/efficient combination of Risk Treatments.

- Issue Evaluation Plan/ Corrective Action Alternatives Study Plan submittal to FERC
- Quantitative Risk Workshops planned for 2027

2027 +

If Feasible and Risk Reduction Sufficient: Initiate Retrofit Design and Permitting

If Not Feasible or Risk Reduction Insufficient: Consider New FCO Headworks Structure
(Continues to be Unlikely)

- Design and Construction Phases have been included in SWP Dam Safety Program's planning and budgeting.



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5-Year Director's Safety Review Board / Part 12D Safety Inspections for Oroville Complex Dams

- California Water Code - Director's Safety Review Board
- Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's Part 12D Safety Inspection.
- Retained Consultants through a Request for Qualifications process and approved by FERC and DSOD.
- December 5 - 7, 2023: DSRB inspection with DSOD
- January 22 - 25, 2024: Part 12D Periodic Inspection with FERC
- DSRB Reports were finalized in May 2024.
- Part 12D Periodic Inspection Reports were finalized in July 2024.
- ***Oroville, Parish Camp Saddle, and Bidwell Bar Canyon Saddle Dams found safe for continued use and reservoir impoundment.***



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Next Cycle of FERC Part 12D Inspections

- Oroville, Parish Camp, Bidwell Bar Canyon, and Thermalito Diversion Dams will be Part 12 “Comprehensive Assessments”.
 - Includes Potential Failure Mode Analysis/Level 2 Risk Analysis
 - Scope of Work for Independent Consultants includes visual inspection of facilities and reviews of:
 - Engineering analyses on-record,
 - Dam safety instrumentation data and performance
 - Progress on previous recommendations
 - Public Safety Program
 - Owner’s Dam Safety Program
- Late 2027: Retain Independent Consultant Team
- 2028: Perform Inspections, PFMA/Level 2 Risk Analyses
- July 2029: Submit Reports to FERC

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An aerial photograph of a large dam and reservoir. The dam is a long, low structure with a central spillway where water is cascading down. The reservoir is a large body of blue water, surrounded by green hills and mountains. In the background, there are more mountains under a clear blue sky. The word "Questions?" is overlaid in the center of the image.

Questions?



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WATER RESOURCES

ITEM 3

OROVILLE ANNUAL BUDGET & PROJECT PRIORITIZATION UPDATE

State Water Project Oroville Annual Maintenance & Projects

Oroville Citizens Advisory Commission Meeting
October 21, 2025



Scott Turnquist, Oroville Field Division Manager
SWP Division of Operations and Maintenance



Oroville Field Division Program Area Responsibilities:

Operations and Maintenance of:

- Oroville Thermalito Complex
 - 7 dams, 2 pump/gen power plants, 1 powerplant, reservoirs, recreation facilities, Feather River Fish Hatchery, Lake Oroville Visitors Center
- Upper Feather River Facilities
 - 3 dams and reservoirs
 - Water master service areas
 - Weather / Precipitation monitoring sites



Annual O&M Field Division Activities

Facilities Operations & Maintenance

- Preventative Maintenance
- Condition Assessment Inspections
- Dam Safety Surveillance
- Civil Maintenance
- Facilities Security
- Facilities Safety
- Plant Operations
- Visitors Center Operations
- Area Control Centers
- Planning and Scheduling

Field Division Administration

- Business Services
(Warehouse Operations)
- Training & Development
- Program Management
- Service Contracts
- Engineering Support
- FERC License Compliance



Annual Operation & Maintenance Activities

HYATT POWERPLANT

- Unit Reliability Outage
- Condition Assessment Program Inspection
- Unit Transformers Annual Maintenance
- Unit Annual Maintenance & Relay Testing
- Switchyard and Breaker Inspections
- Unit Runner Inspections and Repair
- Fire Systems Annual Inspection/Testing
- Station Service Annual Maintenance
- Battery/Charger Testing

THERMALITO POWERPLANT

- Unit Reliability Outage
- Condition Assessment Program Inspection
- Unit Transformer Annual Maintenance
- Station Service Transformer Annual Maintenance
- Fire Systems Annual Inspection/Testing
- Unit Breaker Maintenance
- Bypass Gate Reliability Inspection
- Battery/Charger Testing

THERMALITO DIVERSION DAM POWERPLANT

- Unit Annual Outage/Inspection
- Radial Gate Full Open Testing
- Battery/Charger Testing

OROVILLE DAM/LAKE / THERMALITO FB/AB / OTHER LOCATIONS

- **DSOD/FERC Annual Inspections**
- Intake Shutter Annual Maintenance
- Fence Repair and Gate/Sign Maintenance
- Oroville Spillway Radial Gate Testing
- Roadway Maintenance
- Fish Hatchery Annual Maintenance
- Oroville Lake Debris Removal/Log Boom Maintenance
- **Dam Surveillance and Monitoring – DAILY**
- Water Flow and Temperature Monitoring – DAILY
- Water Quality Sampling
- **Debris Removal/Erosion Repair – All Dams**
- **Vegetation Maintenance – All Dams**
- Fuel Load Reduction

UPPER FEATHER RIVER DAMS/LAKES

- **DSOD Annual Inspections**
- **Vegetation Maintenance – All Dams**
- **Debris Removal – All Dams**
- Roadway Maintenance
- Debris Removal/Erosion Repair
- Precipitation Site Maintenance
- **Dam Surveillance and Monitoring**
- Watermaster Areas
- Annual Snow Surveys



State Water Project Capital Prioritization Process



Prioritization Output

- Next year's Workplan
- Multi-year Capital Plan



Project Prioritization

- SWP has more potential projects than could be accomplished in any given year (consistent with most every organization)
- DWR uses Asset Management principles to prioritize our work:
 - Assess the risk reduction for each project
 - Identify the resources needed for each project
- We use prioritization to determine how to:
 - Do the right work
 - At the right time
 - With the right resources



Risk Matrix

Likelihood												
10 times in a year	10											
w/in 1 year	9											
w/ in 3 years	8.5											
w/ in 10 years	8											
w/ in 30 years	7.5											
w/ in 100 years	7											
w/ in 1,000 years	6											
w/in 10,000 years	5											
w/in 100,000 years	4											
w/in 1,000,000 years	3											
w/in 10,000,000 years	2											
> 10,000,000 years	1											
Consequence Category		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
		Insignificant	Minor	Moderate	High	Major	Extreme	Catastrophic				
Public Safety												
Financial Impact												
Personnel Safety												
Compliance												
Flexibility & Reliability - Water Delivery												
Flexibility & Reliability - Other SWP Purposes												
Reputation												



Consequence Criteria

Consequence Category	Consequence										
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
Public Safety	No injury	Near miss	Minor injuries not requiring medical attention	Single injury requiring medical attention	Multiple injuries or permanent disability	Fatality 0 - 1	Fatalities 1 - 10	Fatalities 10 - 100	Fatalities 100 - 1,000	Fatalities 1,000 - 10,000	Fatalities >10,000
Financial Impact	< \$100k	\$100k - \$1M	\$1M - \$10M	\$10M - \$100M	\$100M - \$1B	\$1B - \$10B	\$10B - \$100B	>\$100B			
Personnel Safety	No injury	Near miss or minor injuries not requiring medical attention	Single injury requiring medical attention	Multiple injuries requiring medical attention or permanent disability	Fatality 0 - 1	Fatalities 1 - 10	Fatalities >10				
Compliance	No violation	Minor restrictions or increased oversight.	Violation or fines	Violation(s), fines, restricted use or prosecution	Sanctions. Lose rights to operate a facility						
Flexibility and Reliability – Water Delivery	No impact	Unable to meet delivery schedule in a Field Division	Unable to meet water delivery schedules in multiple Field Divisions	Inability to meet SWP water deliveries; Cascading effect results in damage to other facilities	Inability to meet health and safety water needs; Cascading effect results in uncontrolled release of water						
Flexibility and Reliability – Other SWP Purposes	No impact	Minor impact to recreation and fish & wildlife	Minor impact to power generation Major impact to recreation and fish & wildlife	Minor impact to flood control Major impact to power generation	Major impact to flood control						
Reputation	Questions raised by elected local officials	Questions by State or Federal officials	Negative local media coverage Concerns from State or Federal officials	Negative state media coverage Legislative hearing	Negative national media coverage Legislative action	Consent to operate SWP revoked					



Project Driven Risk Reduction

Likelihood		DWR Division of Operations & Maintenance Risk Matrix						
Likely to occur 10 times a year	7	7	14	21	28	35	42	49
Likely to occur within 1 year	6	6	12	18	24	30	36	42
Likely to occur within 3 years	5.5	5.5	11	16.5	22	27.5	35	38.5
Likely to occur within 10 years	5	5	10	15	20	25	30	35
Likely to occur within 30 years	4.5	4.5	9	13.5	18	22.5	26	31.5
Likely to occur within 100 years	4	4	8	12	16	20	24	28
Likely to occur within 1000 years	3	3	6	9	12	15	18	21
Likely to occur within 10,000 years	2	2	4	6	8	10	12	14
Likely to occur within 100,000 years	1	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
		Consequence						
Consequence Category		1 Insignificant	2 Minor	3 Moderate	4 High	5 Major	6 Extreme	7 Catastrophic

Pre-Project Risk
If no action is taken, risk is here

Mitigated Risk
We have reduced risk by X points

Post-Project Risk
If action is taken risk is here



Oroville Expenditures

Expense Type	Actual Expenditures				Planned Expenditures	
	CY2021	CY2022	CY2023	CY2024	CY2025	CY2026
Annual Operations & Maintenance (O&M)	\$53.0M	\$60.7M	\$60.3M	\$66.4M	\$55.6M	\$59.3M
Capital Projects	\$45.3M	\$41.5M	\$60.6M	\$28.2M	\$39.3M	\$32.5M
TOTAL	\$98.2M	\$102.2M	\$120.9M	\$94.6M	\$94.9M	\$91.7M

Notes:

1. Includes Dam Safety Services projects.
2. RVOS and Bridge Seismic Retrofit projects moved out of OFD project budget starting in CY24



2025 Capital Improvement Projects

Name	Total Estimated Project Budget	Name	Total Estimated Project Budget
TADM Radial Gate Programmatic REF	\$ 30,680,853		
TADM Well Replacement Phase 2	\$ 10,393,379	OPH LCB Office Building - Phase 1	\$ 1,988,943
Canyon Crk Bridge - T-1 Steel BW Rep	\$ 10,353,504	Canyon Crk Bridge Seismic Retrofit Ph1	\$ 1,607,013
OFD FCO SEG Relocation and Upgrade	\$ 9,951,587	CNA Early Imp. Raise PCDM Assessment	\$ 1,569,732
FRFH Water Treatment Upgrades Ph 1	\$ 8,781,347	THPP Gantry Crane Refurb	\$ 1,387,077
HYPP Unit #4 Generator Ref	\$ 8,498,203	McCabe Cove Cultural Resources	\$ 1,364,827
Oroville Dam FCO Spillway Repairs	\$ 6,398,538	CNA Early Imp. Palermo Canal Relining	\$ 1,208,137
ORDM Grout Gallery Piezo Install	\$ 6,151,316	HYPP 13.8kV Breaker Retrofit	\$ 1,075,440
Seal and Pave Roads - OFD	\$ 4,923,405	Oroville FD ACC Video Wall	\$ 1,004,061
FCO Hoist Refurbishment	\$ 4,190,934	OP102 HYPP Manual Update	\$ 949,429
Enterprise Bridge Seismic Retrofit Ph 1	\$ 3,335,272	ORDM FCO Radial Gate Seis Repair Design	\$ 939,321
TPC Slope Repair Phase 1	\$ 3,193,513	HYPP Spare Transformer Refurbishment	\$ 863,407
HYPP and THPP 230KV Retrofit	\$ 3,030,206	HYPP Intake Gates Replacement - Ph1 Design	\$ 847,365
THPP U1 Runner & Discharge Ring Refurb	\$ 2,951,292	HYPP Station Service Transformers Refurb	\$ 787,802
THAB Western-Richvale Outlet Rehab	\$ 2,739,592	OFD O&M Center Admin HVAC Replacement	\$ 778,842
ORDM FCO Seismic Retrofit Altern Study	\$ 2,601,706	HYPP Ventilation System Modification	\$ 729,019
OFD - TPC Spall Repair	\$ 2,357,269	Beckwourth Pavement Replacement	\$ 716,212
Bidwell Bar Bridge Seismic Retrofit Ph 1	\$ 2,077,336	HYPP Service&Depress Air Compress Replacement	\$ 380,228

Includes projects from Dam Safety Services and O&M Project Management (Bridges, Dams)



CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF
WATER RESOURCES

ITEM 4

WATER CONTROL MANUAL UPDATE

ITEM 5

DOWNSTREAM PERSPECTIVE ON WATER CONTROL MANUAL

ITEM 6


OCAC AGENDA & TRIANNUAL LEGISLATIVE REPORT UPDATE

MEETING 22 AGENDA

PROPOSED TOPICS

1. Relicensing
2. [Pending Availability] City of Oroville levee screening report

Commission Report 2 Development & Commissioner Input Timeline



Report and Content Mandated by SB 955

The commission must publish a report once every three years that provides the following:

1. An overview of ongoing maintenance and improvements made at the dam and its site.
2. A register of communications received from the department and other parties to the Commission.
3. Notice of upcoming plans made by the department for the dam and its site.
4. An overview of flood management projects on the Feather River affecting public safety and flood risk reduction.

ITEM 7

PUBLIC COMMENT

**The Oroville Dam Citizens Advisory
Commission will now take public comment.**

We appreciate your input.

ITEM 8

ADJOURN

Commission Meeting #22

February 2026