Rehearing Denied June 25, 1975.
The San Francisco Ecology Center and others brought mandamus action under the Environmental Quality Act against the City and County of San Francisco and others to set aside resolutions adopting an environmental impact report and approving the expansion of the San Francisco International Airport. From a judgment of the Superior Court, County of San Francisco, Ira A. Brown, Jr., J., denying the petition for writ of mandamus, the plaintiffs appealed. The Court of Appeal, Christian, J., held, inter alia, that an EIR must be considered by sponsoring public agency before it finally approves or disapproves a project affected by the Environmental Quality Act; that the EQA is to be interpreted broadly to afford full protection to the environment; that the trial court was not required to exercise its independent judgment on the evidence; that the EIR was not inadequate in the respects challenged; and that the findings of the airport commission and board of supervisors in adopting the EIR were supported by substantial evidence.
William M. Brinton, Ricardo J. Hecht, San Francisco, for plaintiffs and appellants.
Thomas M. O'Connor, City Atty. of the City and County of San Francisco, William F. Bourne, Utilities Gen. Counsel, Jerome Cohen, Deputy City Atty. David I. Kroopnick, Deputy City Atty., San Francisco, for defendants and respondents.
CHRISTIAN, Associate Justice.
San Francisco Ecology Center and others brought this action under the
environmental Quality Act of 1970 (hereinafter 'EQA') against the City
and County of San Francisco and others to set aside resolutions adopting
an environmental impact report ('EIR') and approving the expansion of San
Francisco International Airport. The appeal is from a judgment denying
a petition for a writ of mandamus.
FN1 Public Resources Code section 21050 et seq.An EIR must be considered by the sponsoring public agency before it finally approves or disapproves a project affected by the act. (Pub.Resources Code, s 21061.) Concern has been expressed regarding whether a project which adversely affects the environment must necessarily be rejected. (Note (1974) 5 Pac.L.J. 92, 109; see also Seneker, The Legislative Response to Friends of Mammoth (1973) 48 St.Bar J. 127, 185.) The statutory scheme, however, suggests that EQA is not to be so construed. Public Resources Code sections 21108, subdivision (a) (relating to state agencies) and 21152 (relating to local agencies) provide for the filing of a notice of determination for projects approved by a public agency and require the notice to state whether a project will or will not have a significant effect on the environment. Inferably, the Legislature had contemplated that projects which adversely affect the environment may nonetheless be approved. In recognition of this view, the Resources Secretary has provided by regulation that 'indications of adverse impact (do not) require that a project be disapproved.' (14 Cal.Admin.Code, s 15012.) The existence of significant environmental hazards does not necessarily require the disapproval of a project. (Note (1974) 5 Pac.L.J. 26, 44--45.)
FN2 Section 21108, subdivision (a), provides:Whenever a state agency, board, or commission approves or determines to carry out a project which is subject to the provisions of this division, it shall file notice of such approval or such determination with the Secretary of the Resources Agency. Such notice shall indicate the determination of the agency, board, or commission whether the project will, or will not, have a significant effect on the environment and shall indicate whether an environmental impact report has been prepared pursuant to the provisions of this division.
FN3 Section 21152, subdivision (a), provides:The EQA requires the decision-maker to balance the benefits of a proposed project against its unavoidable environmental risks in determining whether to approve the project (cf. 42 U.S.C., s 4332, subd. (2)(B) with Pub.Resources Code, s 21001, subd. (g); 14 Cal.Admin.Code, s 15012; see Burger v. County of Mendocino (1975) 45 Cal.App.3d 322, 326, 119 Cal.Rptr. 568). Indeed, the failure to employ this balancing analysis may be grounds for nullifying an administrative decision. (Burger v. County of Mendocino, Supra; cf. Friends of Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors (1972) 8 Cal.3d 247, 263, fn. 8, 104 Cal.Rptr. 761, 502 P.2d 1049; Robie, California's Environmental Quality Act--A Substantive Right to a Better Environment? (1973) 49 L.A.Bar Bulletin 17, 42--43.)
FN4 42 U.S.C. section 4332, subdivision (2)(B), provides: '(A)ll agencies of the Federal Government shall . . . identify and develop methods and procedures, in consultation with the Council on Environmental Quality established by subchapter II of this chapter, which will insure that presently unquantified environmental amenities and values may be given appropriate consideration in decision-making along with economic and technical considerations; . . .' (See, e.g., Calvert Cliffs' Coord. Com., Inc. v. United States A.E. Com'n (1971), 146 U.S.App.D.C. 33, 449 F.2d 1109, 1113--1114.)The EQA is to be interpreted broadly to afford full protection to the environment (No Oil, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (1974) 13 Cal.3d 68, 83, 118 Cal.Rptr. 34, 529 P.2d 66; Friends of Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors, Supra, 8 Cal.3d at p. 259, 104 Cal.Rptr. 761, 502 P.2d 1049). Several commentators have accordingly suggested that a public agency must assign greater weight to environmental, as opposed to economic, factors in determining whether to approve a project which carries risks of unavoidable environmental harm. (See 5 Pac.L.J. 92, 110; Note (1973) 9 Cal.Western L.Rev. 536, 543.) While economic environmental values may be given equal weight under the comparable federal statute (see Calvert Cliffs' Coord. Com., Inc. v. United States A.E. Com'n, Supra, 146 U.S.App.D.C. 33, 449 F.2d 1109, 1113, 1123; accord, Port of New York Authority v. United States (2d Cir. 1971) 451 F.2d 783, 789; Daly v. Volpe (W.D.Wash.1974) 376 F.Supp. 987, 995; Montgomery v. Ellis (N.D.Ala.1973) 364 F.Supp. 517, 522; contra, Sierra Club v. Froehlke (S.D.Tex.1973) 359 F.Supp. 1289, 1370, rev. on other grounds, 5 Cir., 499 F.2d 982), the federal precedents are of diminished value in view of substantial differences between the federal and state statutes. The needs of economic growth are expressly recognized in the congressional declaration of policy under the National Environmental Policy Act. The federal government is directed to 'fulfill the social, economic, and other requirements of present and future generations of Americans' as well as environmental goals (42 U.S.C. s 4331, subd. (a)), and subdivision (b)(5) of the code seeks to establish 'a balance between population and resource use which will permit high standards of living and a wide sharing of life's amenities; . . .' The federal government is required only to give 'appropriate consideration' to environmental values under the act (42 U.S.C., s 4332, subd. (2)(B)). The state statute, on the other hand, suggests that environmental protection is of paramount concern. A sense of urgency is conveyed in several provisions of the statute. Public Resources Code section 21000, subdivision (d), requires the state to 'take immediate steps to identify any critical thresholds for the health and safety of the people of the state and take all coordinated actions necessary to prevent such thresholds being reached.' Subdivision (g) emphasizes that activities should be regulated 'so that Major consideration is given to preventing environmental damage.' (Emphasis added; see 14 Cal.Admin.Code, s 15012.) Section 21001, subdivision (d), declares that 'the long-term protection of the environment shall be the guiding criterion in public decisions.'
The legislative history of the EQA also supports the view that environmental values are to be assigned greater weight than the needs of economic growth. In the legislative study from which the statute emerged, it was said that:
Economic growth has always been regarded as a major criterion of our economy's performance. Growth implies that our economy is well functioning and providing an ever greater benefit to society. By 1971, our gross national product (GNP), the total market value of all goods and services produced in a year, will be more than one trillion dollars. California's total output is greater than $100 billion, an output surpassed by only six countries in the world. Does this growth in affluence mean we are better off than before? Not necessarily. Economic growth means that the goods and services produced for the market have increased, but it tells us nothing of the composition or quality of this output. More importantly, with respect to the environment, economic growth does not reflect the increase in those products which are not sold, such as smog and pollution. Paradoxically, if smog increases and, thus, the number of anti-smog devices sold increases, growth appears to have occurred. Clearly, we are not better off because of this spurious growth concept.
(California Assembly Select Committee on Environmental Quality, 'Environmental Bill of Rights' (1970) p. 17.) 'An environment that is healthful to man should command the Highest priority, for a degraded environment poses a physical threat to man.' (Id., p. 35 (emphasis added). Accord, County of Inyo v. Yorty (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d 795, 804, 108 Cal.Rptr. 377.) The act thus requires decision-makers to assign greater priorities to environmental values than to economic needs. That is not to say that the courts will substitute their judgment for that of the responsible agency. (See Plan for Arcadia, Inc. v. City Council of Arcadia (1974) 42 Cal.App.3d 712, 725--726, 117 Cal.Rptr. 96.)
The San Francisco International Airport is owned by the city and operated by the San Francisco Airports Commission. The airports commission is empowered to construct improvements or related facilities at the airport. The city, airports commission and city planning commission are all local, public agencies within the definition of Public Resources Code sections 21062 and 21063 (San Francisco Admin.Code, ch. 31, s 31.05, subd. (a)). Under the provisions of chapter 31 of the San Francisco Administrative Code, the Department of City Planning is charged with the responsibility of preparing a draft EIR for projects covered by the EQA (s 31.25, subd. (a)). Following public hearings held by the city planning commission (s 31.27, subd. (b)(3)), a final EIR must be prepared by the department based upon the draft and consultations and comments received during the review process (s 31.28, subd. (a)). The city planning commission is charged with the duty of certifying the completion of an EIR, which must contain a finding whether the project will or will not have a significant effect on the environment (s 31.28, subd. (e)). The certificate of completion and the final EIR must then be transmitted by the department to the agency which will decide whether to carry out or approve the project (s 31.29, subd. (a)). Before deciding whether to approve the project, the decision-making body must take the final EIR into consideration (s 31.29, subd. (b)); it may then decide whether the project should be carried out (s 31.29, subd. (c)). These procedures are intended to conform to environmental review requirements imposed on local agencies by Public Resources Code section 21150 et aeq.
In December 1972, the airports commission desired to expand the existing facilities of San Francisco Airport. Because the contemplated expansion program obviously might have a significant effect on the environment, a draft EIR was prepared, evaluating the environmental and economic effects of the project. Public hearings were held before the city planning commission and comments were received from public agencies, private organizations, and individuals regarding the adequacy of the draft EIR. The department of city planning wrote responses to the comments received and prepared data to supplement the draft. The final EIR was certified by the city planning commission as adequate, accurate and objective. On November 7, 1973, the airports commission by resolution adopted the final EIR and approved the expansion program. The commission acknowledged that the project would have adverse environmental effects but found that these effects were outweighted by the overall benefits of the plan. Following public hearings on the adequacy of the report, the board of supervisors adopted the final EIR for substantially the same reasons given by the airports commission.
Appellants contend that the trial court was bound to exercise its independent
judgment on the evidence. That contention is contrary to the express provisions
of Public Resources Code section 21168. Assuming for the purposes of discussion
that de novo review might be constitutionally required in some cases and
as to some parties, appellants did not allege deprivation of a fundamental
vested right, as required by Strumsky v. San Diego County Employees
Retirement Ass'n (1974)11 Cal.3d 28, 112 Cal.Rptr. 805, 520 P.2d 29;
moreover, they actually conceded at trial that the substantial evidence
rule was the proper standard of review. Thus we do not reach the question
whether the Legislature may in all cases constitutionally limit the scope
of judicial review under Public Resources Code section 21168. (See Friends
of Lake Arrowhead v. Board of Supervisors (1974) 38 Cal.App.3d 497, 518,
fn. 18, 113 Cal.Rptr. 539.)
FN6 Public Resources Code section 21168 provides:In any such action, the court shall not exercise its independent judgment on the evidence but shall only determine whether the act or decision is supported by substantial evidence in the light of the whole record.
It is claimed that the EIR was inadequate in several respects. In determining
the adequacy of the report, the courts may appropriately refer to federal
cases decided under the analogous National Environmental Policy Act. (Compare
42 U.S.C., s 4332, subd. (2)(C), with Public Resources Code section 21100;
Friends of Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors, Supra, 8 Cal.3d 247, 260--261,
104 Cal.Rptr. 761, 502 P.2d 1049; Environmental Defense Fund, Inc.
v. Coastside County Water Dist. (1972) 27 Cal.App.3d 695, 701, 104 Cal.Rptr.
197.) The report should provide decision-makers with information which
enables them to make a decision which intelligently takes account of the
environmental consequences (14 Cal.Admin.Code, s 15012; see Trout Unlimited
v. Morton (9th Cir. 1974) 509 F.2d 1276, 1282). However, an evaluation
of the environmental effects of a proposed project need not be exhaustive
(see Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton (1972) 148 U.S.App.D.C.
5, 458 F.2d 827, 836). The sufficiency of an EIR is to be reviewed
in the light of what is reasonably feasible (Environmental Def. F.,
Inc. v. Corps of Eng. of U.S. Army (5th Cir. 1974) 492 F.2d 1123, 1131;
National Helium Corporation v. Morton (10th Cir. 1973) 486 F.2d 995,
1002, cert. den. 416 U.S. 993, 94 S.Ct. 2405, 40 L.Ed.2d 772; Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, Supra, 458 F.2d at p. 834).
Preparation of an EIR need not be interminably delayed 'to include all
potential comments or results of works in progress which might shed some
additional light on the subject of the impact statement. . . . The courts
should look for adequacy and completeness in an impact statement, not perfection.'
(National Helium Corp. v. Morton, Supra, 486 F.2d at p. 1004; see
also Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Eng., U.S. Army (8th Cir.
1972) 470 F.2d 289, 297, cert. den. 412 U.S. 931, 93 S.Ct. 2749, 37 L.Ed.2d
160.) The agency charged with preparation of the report is not barred
from making reasonable forecasts (see Scientists' Inst. for Pub. Info.,
Inc. v. Atomic Energy Com'n (1973), 156 U.S.App.D.C. 395, 481 F.2d 1079,
1092), and disagreements among experts do not require the invalidation
of an EIR. (Life of Land v. Brinegar (9th Cir. 1973) 485 F.2d 460, 472,
cert. den. 416 U.S. 961, 94 S.Ct. 1979, 40 L.Ed.2d 312.) While decision-makers
must take account of environmental objections (Silva v. Lynn (1st Cir.
1973) 482 F.2d 1282, 1285; accord, People v. County of Kern (1974)
39 Cal.App.3d 830, 841--842, 115 Cal.Rptr. 67), satisfactory answers
to these objections may be provided by reference to the EIR itself (see
Lathan v. Volpe (W.D.Wash.1972) 350 F.Supp. 262, 265, vacated on other
grounds, 9 Cir., 506 F.2d 677).
FN7 42 U.S.C., section 4332, subdivision (2)(C), provides: . . . (2) all agencies of the Federal Government shall--
FN8 Public Resources Code section 21100 provides:Appellants complaint that the EIR may have overestimated the number of passengers who would use the airport in 1985. But decision-makers are not precluded from forecasting future needs; indeed, they are encouraged to make reasonable forecasts in the preparation of the EIR (see Scientists' Inst. for Pub. Info., Inc. v. Atomic Energy Com'n, Supra, 481 F.2d at p. 1092). Here the estimates were supported by expert opinion. If subsequent studies undermine the projections upon which the EIR is based, opponents should bring the new data to the attention of the decision-makers (Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Eng., U.S. Army, Supra, 470 F.2d at p. 297). These observations also apply to the EIR's projections of aircraft noise levels in 1986.
It is claimed that the estimated economic benefits of the project were not substantiated inasmuch as the estimates were allegedly based on hearsay. But the rules of evidence which govern the trial of a court action do not apply to the collection of data in the preparation of an EIR. '(I)t is well settled that supporting studies need not be physically attached to the EIS. They only need be available and accessible.' (Trout Unlimited v. Morton, Supra, 509 F.2d at p. 1284; see also Life of Land v. Brinegar, Supra, 485 F.2d at pp. 468--469.) There is no evidence that the supporting study was unavailable for appellants' perusal; hence, appellants can hardly complain that the estimate was not supported by competent analysis. Likewise, a study of existing air pollution levels was referred to in the EIR, but appellants apparently chose to ignore it. They cannot now claim that the EIR does not sufficiently describe the existing hazards of air pollution.
The EIR is assailed for allegedly failing to examine the possibility of mitigating auto traffic problems by rescheduling flights. But the supplementary data indicates that the option of rescheduling flights in cooperation with the federal authorities had been explored. Appellants also argue that an EIR is incomplete if it does not contain cost-benefit computations. Neither the EQA nor the National Environmental Policy Act requires computation of a cost-benefit ratio. Such studies may be useful, but they are not indispensable to an environmental impact statement (Trout Unlimited v. Morton, Supra, 509 F.2d at pp. 1286--1287, fn. 14; Sierra Club v. Lynn (5th Cir. 1974) 502 F.2d 43, 60--61; United Family Farmers v. Morton (Dist.Ct.S.D.1974) 6 E.R.C. 1822, 1826; Warm Springs Dam Task Force v. Gribble (N.D.Cal.1974) 378 F.Supp. 240, 246--247; Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Armstrong (N.D.Cal.1972) 352 F.Supp. 50, 57, aff'd, 9 Cir., 487 F.2d 814, cert. den. 416 U.S. 974, 94 S.Ct. 2002, 40 L.Ed.2d 564).
The final EIR must include the responses of the proponent agency to significant environmental points raised in the review and consultation process. (14 Cal.Admin.Code, s 15146.) Appellants contend that the responses were inadequate; but the final EIR responded to objections relating to noise, air pollution, traffic problems, growth-inducing impact and tax burdens on San Francisco residents. While the responses were not exhaustive, they do evince good faith and reasoned analysis. (See People v. County of Kern, Supra, 39 Cal.App.3d at p. 842, 115 Cal.Rptr. 67.) We cannot say that the trial court erred in concluding that the EIR was adequate.
Appellants claim that the administrative findings supporting the decisions of the airports commission and board of supervisors were inadequate. In the absence of a statutory requirement, administrative findings will be deemed adequate if they are sufficient to apprise interested parties and the courts of the bases for the administrative action. (See Topanga Ass'n for a Scenic Community v. County of Los Angeles (1974) 11 Cal.3d 506, 515--517, 113 Cal.Rptr. 836, 522 P.2d 12.) The resolutions attacked by appellants identify certain adverse environmental effects and prospective benefits of the project; they reflect the judgment that the social, economic and environmental benefits of the project outweigh its significant environmental risks. Since the resolutions adequately expose the agency's mode of analysis, they must be sustained if supported by substantial evidence. People v. County of Kern, Supra, 39 Cal.App.3d 830, 115 Cal.Rptr. 67, does not require a contrary conclusion. There, the court had invalidated an EIR because the agency had failed to respond to objections raised against the proposed project (39 Cal.App.3d at p. 842, 115 Cal.Rptr. 67). The sufficiency of administrative findings was not in issue in that case. Moreover, insofar as County of Kern suggests that agencies must set forth reasons why the benefits of the project outweigh significant environmental objections (see also Burger v. County of Mendocino, Supra, 45 Cal.App.3d 322, 119 Cal.Rptr. 568), the resolutions indicate that both the airports commission and the board of supervisors had complied with this requirement.
The findings of the airports commission and board of supervisors are supported by substantial evidence. Several witnesses testified that the project would make the San Francisco International Airport an exceptionally convenient, safe and compact airport. The expanded terminals will, according to some evidence, improve the operational efficiency and safety of the airport and reduce noise levels by accommodating larger and quieter aircraft. Adjacent communities will benefit from noise refuction due to the expansion of a preferred runway. The quality of effluent entering San Francisco Bay from the airport will be improved by the construction of sanitary and industrial waste treatment plants and a deep water outfall sewer line. Since airlines are converting to more efficient engines, air pollution is expected to be reduced below 1972 levels. There was evidence that the expansion project will employ more than 600 construction workers, generate some 30,000 additional basic and secondary jobs, and increase tax revenues. If this evidence is correct, the project will have significant environmental as well as economic benefits, weighing against the environmental disadvantages. We cannot say that the court erred in upholding the administrative determination that the benefits of the project outweigh the acknowledged hazards of increases in ground traffic, energy consumption and growth inducement.
Finally, appellants contend that they were not given notice of a change in time for the meeting at which the airports commission adopted the final EIR and approved the airport expansion program. Section 15165, subdivision (c), 14 California Administrative Code, requires timely notice to interested parties of all public hearings. While the evidence was in conflict, the secretary of the airports commission stated that notice of the change in the time of the meeting had been sent to appellants. Apparently the trial court determined the issue in respondents' favor (see Block v. Laboratory Procedures, Inc. (1970) 8 Cal.App.3d 1042, 1045, 87 Cal.Rptr. 778). That determination is to be upheld on appeal. (6 Witkins, Cal.Procedure (2d ed. 1971) Appeal, s 245, p. 4236.)
The judgment is affirmed.
CALDECOTT, P.J., and EMERSON, J., concur.
Retired judge of the superior court sitting under appointment by the Chairman of the Judicial Council.